Kuzari Principle, Round 3 5*INFO

Kuzari Principle, Round 3

Is it rational to believe that a nation of former slaves, the Hebrews, experienced a mass Divine revelation at Sinai?

Frankly, I don’t know. I do know, however, that the so-called Kuzari Principle is insufficient as a basis for said belief. I have written many posts on the Kuzari Principle and I have answered many challenges. Let me briefly summarize these posts:
Round 1:

• The Kuzari Principle: Ultimate Proof of God’s Existence? – An introduction to Kuzari with background and applications.
• The Sinai Argument – A sketch of how Kuzari gets used to argue for Sinai.
• Definitively Refuting the Kuzari Principle – An analysis of Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb’s Kuzari arguments that concludes Kuzari fails to prove either Sinai or Judaism.
• Kuzari Keeps on Giving, or Pay No Attention to the Assumptions Behind My Principle! – A review of early emails with Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb on my Kuzari refutation.
• Kuzari: Final Thoughts – A bullet list of key disagreements between Rabbi Gottlieb and me.
• Are Divine-Human Interactions Possible? – A meditation on establishing the possibility of the divine.
• Going Nuclear on the Kuzari Principle – An extended treatment of Rabbi Gottlieb’s call for false NETs and a presentation of a real NET: the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945.
• Kuzari Principle: Index of Posts – Summation of important conclusions on Kuzari, and a list of all posts to date.

Round 2:

• Kuzari Returns! – A clarification and defense of the “evolving myth hypothesis,” which Kuzari defenders routinely mis-characterize.
• Belief and Evidence (and Bias, Oh My!) – A definition of a task I will take on: explaining the Sinai story.
• Deuteronomy Doesn’t Validate the Sinai Revelation – An examination that concludes Deuteronomy 4:9-40 presents a later account and interpretation of the Sinai event.
• Three Sinai Stories – A presentation of the Sinai stories from the J, E and P biblical sources.
• Why Aren’t There More Sinai-Like Stories? – An inquiry into the alleged uniqueness of Sinai.
• On Evidence and Hypotheses – A discussion on identifying evidence as evidence, with further points on using evidence in hypotheses.
• How the Sinai Story Originated and Developed – An opinion explaining the Sinai story as “a fabrication using pre-existing narrative elements which may have been factual at some point in the distant past.”

We now enter Round 3, a discussion of a new logical proof (rKP) developed by Sam Lebens at Philosophy of Judaism. Lebens is a philosophy doctorate and, based on our online exchange, a decent fellow. His proof, however, doesn’t sway me.

Here is the full proof, which I will comment on afterward:
(rKP1) A myth will not initially find any traction with a culture who know it to be historically inaccurate, although once it has been adopted and becomes culturally significant, then a culture will not abandon it merely because of its historical inaccuracies.

(rKP2) The generations of a g-chain will not accept a g-narrative about them unless:

1. The generation is the first in the g-chain and witnessed the events for themselves, or
2. The generation received the g-narrative as an inheritance from their parents, although each generation after the first may have members outside of the core of the g-chain who adopt the g-narrative as they join or merge with the community and adopt its history as their own, or
3. The entire generation becomes convinced, presumably only with a large amount of evidence, that a g-chain that was supposed to have reached them was broken – this doesn’t seem to be the case with the small number of Jewish g-narratives, all of which seem to stretch right back into the mist of Jewish pre-history.

(rKP3) G-narratives can be subject to slow corruption and exaggeration. Thus, the fact that a g-narrative is widespread among a contemporary generation of a g-chain is no reason to believe that that g-narrative presents an accurate history.

(rKP4) The original g-narrative, before any corruption or exaggeration, must have been sufficiently impressive in and of itself to have initiated a sustained desire to transmit the story down a g-chain.

(rKP5) There are a small number of remarkable and widespread g-narratives about the Jewish people, about mass revelation and divine deliverance. These narratives are still transmitted to the majority of Jewish children by their parents at events like the Seder Night, in which Jewish parents recount the exodus from Egypt for the benefit of their children. This ritual retelling is even conducted by a very large number of Jews who no longer believe in the historical accuracy of the narrative.

(rKP6) Given (rKP3), the fact that these g-narratives are widespread among the living members of the Jewish g-chain is no reason to trust the historical accuracy of the stories.

(rKP7) But, given (rKP2) and (rKP4), the fact that these g-narratives are widespread does provide good reason to believe that the story wasn’t initially adopted by a generation to whom the story didn’t actually happen, and that the story is grounded in fact even if it’s been distorted, and that the facts, in and of themselves, were sufficiently impressive to generate the very long lasting feeling of cultural obligation to pass the story on down the g-chain.

(rKP8) We have no reason to believe that the details of Jewish g-narratives are historically accurate, but we do have reason to believe that they are grounded in extraordinary facts witnessed by an entire generation of the g-chain.

(rKP9) Therefore, we have good grounds to believe that an entire generation of the forbears of the Jewish people, or an entire generation of a tribe that would later amalgamate into an emergent Jewish people, were collectively witness to an extraordinary sequence of supernatural events, and events that would have been collectively understood as Divine revelationIn discussions with Lebens, I pointed out immediately that rKP1 made me uncomfortable. We have no reason to think it’s true and we probably have better reason to think it’s false. Some clarity may be gained by defining the term “myth,” but otherwise I don’t know what to do with rKP1.

At this point, Lebens wanted to shelve the issue of rKP1’s possible vagueness (and falsity) and move to whether, given rKP1, the whole rKP argument worked. I appreciate his desire to move on, but I think it’s a mistake to do so. I have had many conversations with Kuzari proponents, and I’ve always been struck with the willingness for vagueness on terms such as “myth” and “acceptance.” To me, any argument using Kuzari should require specificity because myth evolution and cultural development are complex forces. If we cannot be sufficiently clear in our terms, how can we hope to say anything true and useful?

One quick example to illustrate: If I talk about the role of the King of England, that role is very different in the twentieth century ( I know we are now in the 21at century) than it was in 1520 or 1214. The term means very different things across the three dates. Consider, then, how we might assess whether a myth, story, or meme gained “traction” (see rKP1) in an ancient Near Eastern culture? Any point we want to make about “traction” would need to consider what the term meant in that world and then meant later. Thus, if “traction” meant something like “repeated approvingly by the priesthood” and then later developed into “a tenet of orthodox belief,” we would want to know–the validity and soundness of our arguments would depend on it.

Throwing my discomfort with terminology and anachronism aside, let me use the following table to introduce my view of the rKP. The right-hand column offers my “translation” of Lebens’s revised Kuzari argument. I have translated it to make clear my understanding of rKP’s essential arguments. I have translated “myth” as “meme” because I think “meme” has less semantic baggage and actually names the essential part of what “myth” seeks to convey.

Is this a “better” Kuzari-based argument than others, such as Gottlieb’s? It depends on one’s criteria for better. To me, it’s great omission is that it doesn’t account for memes that change their importance or their meaning over time. My earlier Kuzari posts addressed this matter. Some memes acquire a place of centrality years after they first “stick,” and this acquisition can  happen for any number of reasons. With respect to the Bible, I recommend my reading of James Kugel’s How to Read the Bible because the book focuses on how Israel’s ancient library of texts became the Bible.

Personally, I think Gottlieb’s argument is more forceful:
In modern language the principle that the Kuzari uses is as follows. I beg you to look at it, hear it, and pay close attention to all of its details. Let E be a possible event which, had it really occurred, would have left behind enormous, easily available evidence of its occurrence. If the evidence does not exist, people will not believe that E occurred. [Emphasis in original]If you buy Gottlieb’s argument, Jewish belief about Sinai almost must be correct. If you buy Lebens’s argument, the most you get is that the witnesses thought they had seen something miraculous. Of course, how much should we care about what illiterate, scientifically ignorant former slaves thought about miracles? I do not use the descriptors to belittle these people, but to set some context on what we are being asked to accept and to rationalize.

So, rKP doesn’t work for me. It’s a series of assumption after assumption that gets us not to reasoned belief but to a question of trust: do we or do we not believe according to what the Torah tells us illiterate, scientifically ignorant former slaves believed?

In rKP, the Kuzari Principle is neutered, but I think Lebens understands that it must be so. He says:
As far as I’m concerned, that is the only power that the Kuzari argument could possibly hope for: the power to justify our belief in Sinai, or something like Sinai, without direct historical evidence. But you’d still need something like ‘indirect’ historical evidence; i.e., evidence about how myths were formed in ancient times. I’m not claiming that we can arrive at justified historical beliefs a priori. I look forward to continued discussion with you, and to your answers to these questions. I’m certainly far from convinced that the Kuzari argument is even as strong as I suggested in this post.Neither Gottlieb’s not Lebens’s Kuzari justifies belief in Sinai, in my opinion. I still hold to the view from my piece on Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
With Sinai, we have one report given from one perspective. We don’t know the report of the people closest to the mountain. We don’t know the observations of witnesses in the very back. We cannot hear the voices of the women, the outsiders, and the opponents. We have no documents from the nations closest to Sinai telling us about something most unusual having happened. The strongest inference we can draw from Sinai is that something–a natural event or some other fantastic occurrence–may have happened out in the wilderness. We may even be able to justify saying something must have happened. We cannot, however, say with any confidence that Sinai happened. Kuzari changes nothing about this because even if the principle itself is 100 percent true, it doesn’t tell us anything about what exactly happened at Sinai, how, to whom, over what time period, and at what stakes. It’s a believer’s reason to believe, a “nice to have.” But it’s not especially compelling to a neutral observer.

And that’s why at this point it’s best to leave the discussion because, with Sinai, the one thing we have not talked about is the one thing we should have been talking about all along: The actual evidence that we have for the actual people we think correspond to “Biblical Israel.” Although this has been a fascinating discussion on logic, belief, and classification of events, we cannot get very far without a collection of real evidence and data. I have already shown that the pro-Kuzari side is not forthcoming when it comes to direct, positive evidence. We cannot derive a clear picture of Biblical Israel, Sinai, or the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki based on a principle. If we truly want to understand the events and these people, we need to study the writings and the physical data, and we need to remember not to get carried away by the existence or non-existence of evidence. The evidence often means what we want it to mean, and the non-evidence doesn’t tell us much of anything.I also think that Kuzari proponents need to go beyond new Kuzari syllogisms. My challenge from an earlier posts still stands:
If the Kuzari discussion is to continue and be productive, it now falls to Kuzari’s champions to delve more deeply into the reality of the Torah–the reality of the Torah as a cultural document that emerged in historical time in certain cultural contexts.Sam, I’m interested in your thoughts. Do you think that Kuzari-oriented discussions will benefit from bringing in historical data, biblical criticism, and sociological studies?

Posted by Larry Tanner 7 comments:  

Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Labels: Blogs and Blogging, Jewisher, Kuzari Principle